A recent decision of the Outer House of the Court of Session, Kristine Ligere v Muhammad Ajid [2026] CSOH 69, offers a valuable reminder that a divorce, once granted, is not easily reopened. The case concerned an attempt to have a decree of divorce reduced, or quashed, so that financial matters could be argued afresh. Lord Braid’s opinion, issued on 24 July 2026, refused that request and, in doing so, clarified how the courts approach these difficult and relatively unusual actions.
For anyone who has been through a separation, or who is worried that a former partner may not have been entirely open about their finances, the case is well worth understanding.
What the Case Was About
The parties married in London in 2013 and had one child. The marriage broke down and, in March 2024, the husband obtained a decree of divorce at Edinburgh Sheriff Court in undefended proceedings. The wife did not take part in that action. She later sought to have the decree reduced, arguing that it had been granted on an inaccurate factual basis and that she had never had the chance to pursue a claim for financial provision.
Her central complaint was that her husband had not made full disclosure of his assets, which she believed included businesses, several bank accounts, prestige cars and possibly property in Pakistan. She argued that, had the true picture been placed before the sheriff, matters would have unfolded very differently.
The court disagreed. After hearing evidence, Lord Braid granted decree of absolvitor in the husband’s favour, meaning the divorce stood and the wife’s action failed.
The Legal Test for Reducing a Decree
Reduction is an equitable remedy, and the courts do not grant it lightly. Drawing on earlier authorities such as Jandoo v Jandoo and Robertson’s Executor v Robertson, the parties agreed a statement of the applicable law. In broad terms, a person seeking reduction has traditionally been expected to show that:
- the decree ought not to have been granted on its merits;
- there is a reasonable explanation for not defending the original action; and
- the whole circumstances of the case justify reduction.
Importantly, Lord Braid took the opportunity to refine how this test should be understood. He observed that the first two elements are, in truth, subsumed within the third. The real question is whether, looking at everything, the interests of justice require the decree to be set aside. He also cautioned against applying too rigid a standard, noting that a decree of divorce might be perfectly sound on its merits while a spouse has still been wrongly denied the opportunity to make a financial claim.
This is a helpful clarification. It confirms that these cases turn on a broad, discretionary assessment rather than a mechanical checklist.
Why the Wife’s Claim Failed
The court examined three issues: the date of separation, the arrangements for the child, and whether there was a genuine financial claim.
On the date of separation, the evidence supported the date used in the divorce, and the court found no reason to think a fresh action would reach a different conclusion. On the child, the affidavits placed before the sheriff had not misled the court in any way that affected the outcome.
The financial claim proved decisive. The wife had already received a cash sum of at least £7,000 when the parties separated. Beyond speculation, she could not demonstrate that there was any significant matrimonial property to divide. Her husband did not appear to lead a lavish lifestyle, his tax affairs had not been queried, and there was no visible sign of hidden wealth. Crucially, she had been given ample opportunity within the action itself to recover documents from her husband but had delayed in doing so. Her late motion to postpone the proof and pursue further recovery was refused as coming too late.
Lord Braid concluded that there was no basis for finding even a “colourable” financial claim. Since the only purpose of reducing the decree would have been to allow such a claim to proceed, and that claim had no real prospect, reduction served no useful purpose.
Key Takeaways
The decision offers several practical lessons for anyone facing divorce proceedings:
- Engage with the process early. The wife was aware of the proceedings and knew the deadline for defending, yet did not lodge a notice of intention to defend or take steps herself. The court accepted she faced genuine difficulties, including language barriers, ill health and an inability to find a solicitor, but these did not, on their own, justify reopening the decree.
- A reasonable excuse is not enough by itself. Even where there is a sound explanation for not defending, the court will weigh it against the strength of any underlying claim. A weak financial case will rarely tip the balance in favour of reduction.
- Build the evidence, do not speculate. Assertions that a former spouse is concealing a “pot of gold” carry little weight without vouching. The time to recover documents and establish the value of matrimonial property is during the action, not afterwards.
- Solicitors act on instructions. The court confirmed that the husband’s solicitor was professionally obliged to minute for decree on her client’s instructions, even knowing the wife was unrepresented. That said, Lord Braid suggested it would have been good practice to tell the wife that a grace period was being allowed.
A Final Word
Ligere v Ajid underlines a simple but important truth: the courts value finality in divorce, and a decree will only be reduced where justice genuinely demands it. For separating couples, the message is to take advice promptly, to take part in the process, and to gather the evidence needed to support any financial claim before, not after, the decree is granted.
At Gibson Kerr, our family law team advises on divorce, separation and financial provision, including cases involving cross-border elements and concerns over financial disclosure. If you are worried about how a separation may affect your financial position, we are here to help.
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